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1. Introduction
The argument that a broad policy and practice ‘response space’
(Tompkins and Adger, 2003) is required to meet the challenges of
current and future climate change is now well-made. However,
questions of how to stimulate and sustain an array of positive
collective and individual responses remain contentious and
challenging. Of late, one area receiving both political and academic
attention is the inclusion of publics into debates about, and
enactments of, climate change mitigation and adaptation policies
and practices (Tompkins et al., 2010), including the use of
deliberative processes (such as Citizens’ Juries or Deliberative
Polling) to debate, for example, policy options for proactive
adaptation strategies (Few et al., 2007).
The deployment of deliberative processes—which is the subject
of this paper—is positioned within calls for greater public dialogue
and engagement around climate change (Marx et al., 2007; Moser,
2010): in particular, arguments that:
‘there is a requirement for governance mechanisms that can
meaningfully acknowledge and negotiate the complexity
arising from the manifestation of diverse values—for example,
deliberative platforms for adaptive action involving wide sets of
stakeholders.’ (Adger et al., 2009: 350).
Such arguments draw on the rationale of the broader
‘deliberative turn’ in environmental decision-making practices
and research (Dryzek, 1997; Smith, 2003). However, to what extent
and in what ways deliberative processes can and do build public
adaptive capacity remains an open question, which requires
further empirical scrutiny (Berkhout, 2010).
In response, this paper discusses research into public percep-
tions of, and reactions to, climate change in the Australian Capital
Region (ACR). It examines what deliberation actually ‘‘does’’ via
shifts in discourses, compared to discursive shifts amongst
members of the public exposed to climate change information,
but not deliberation. It begins with a brief discussion of the
relevance of an ‘adaptive capacity’ framing, then outlines research
design and methodology. The following section discusses the
outcomes of 103 semi-structured interviews with residents of the
ACR into potential climate change impacts in their region, drawing
on both quantitative data from Q methodology and qualitative data
from interview transcription and analysis. Then, comparative data
is discussed for participants who took part in both interviews and a
deliberative process, to examine similarities and differences in
discursive shifts. Finally, this paper discusses these ﬁndings in
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terms of claims made about the role of deliberation in building
public adaptive capacity to respond to climate change.
2. Investigating adaptive capacity: what questions to ask of
deliberation?
Within the recent and growing literature, adaptive capacity is
argued as an integral facet of socio-ecological system resilience
(Folke et al., 2002), deﬁned as a system adjusting positively to take
advantage and/or cope with the impacts of a changing climate
(Gallopin, 2006). Adaptive capacity is claimed to be a vital
component of successful adaptive action, in conjunction with the
societal distribution of these capacities (Adger et al., 2005), made
up of numerous ‘determinants’ that are partially interdependent,
and vary across space, time (Smit and Wandel, 2006; see also
Brooks et al., 2005) and scale (e.g. Posey, 2009).
Determinants are often classiﬁed into social/institutional
elements (e.g. social, human and political capital) and physical
elements (e.g. infrastructure, material wealth and technology) (see
Eakin and Lemos, 2006; Keskitalo et al., 2010). In turn, the former is
segmented into human capital determinants such as learning,
knowledge, and information, as well as the recognition of the
necessity to adapt, which—along with political capital components
such as trust—are argued as vital foundations for adaptive action.
However, while a notable amount has been written about the
economic, material and institutional facets of adaptive capacity, it
is argued that less is known about its cognitive aspects, such as
perceptions and motivations to take action (Lopez-Marrero, 2010),
although there is a growing body of work here, particularly in
relation to public opinion and responses to varied framings of the
climate change issue (e.g. see Morton et al., 2011; Wood and
Vedlitz, 2007).
In theory, deliberative processes may contribute positively to
the fostering of aspects of these social determinants by, for
example, encouraging learning and/or increasing feelings of
personal efﬁcacy and the recognition of climate change as a
genuine problem. Although some evidence does exist for
deliberation having such impacts on participants (see Thompson,
2008), there has been little interrogation of its effects in terms of
building adaptive capacity around current and future climate
change.
What then might be some apposite questions of ask of public
deliberative processes, in terms of adaptive capacity? From
analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature on the social
determinants of adaptive capacity (e.g. Eakin and Lemos, 2006;
Fazey et al., 2007; Folke et al., 2002, 2005; Hahn et al., 2006;
Kalikoski et al., 2010; Lopez-Marrero, 2010; Milestad et al., 2010)
the following questions were drawn out, to be posed of the ACR
research.
 Recognition: Do participants increasingly recognise the need to
adapt/take action around climate change?
 Knowledge: Do they have more knowledge about options and
greater capacity to assess them?
 Motivation: Do participants express greater willingness and
ability (of themselves and others) to mobilize around climate
change?
 Personal efﬁcacy: Do they feel more able to implement these
options?
 Political efﬁcacy: Do perceptions of political capital alter, in terms
of trust in institutions and governance systems?
Before discussing the results of the ACR research vis-a`-vis the
above list of questions, the next section presents an overview of the
project research design and methodology.
3. Social responses to climate change in the ACR: project
rationale and methodology
The research discussed herein sought to gain more in-depth
understanding of how members of the public currently perceive
climate change, as such perceptions will shape (but do not
Fig. 1. The Australian Capital Region and case study areas.
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determine) future actions. While extensive data exists on
projected changes to the climate, less is known about possible
individual and collective behavioural responses to such changes.
Thus, there is a need for intensive research that investigates
responses to different climate change stimulus, to provide ‘thick
descriptions’ (Adger et al., 2003) of how perceptions and reactions
might play out.
However such research is not without methodological and
epistemological challenges, e.g. how to present information about
potential impacts of future climate change given the levels of
uncertainty about actual climate changes impacts (Lorenzoni et al.,
2006): and how to account for the numerous contingencies in
decision-making processes that make modelling human futures
near impossible (e.g. see Berkhout and Hertin, 2000; Vincent,
2007)? However, such challenges should not deter human-
focussed research, and in response, the ACR project explored
social responses to climate change within two regions: the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Goulburn-Mulwaree
Shire (GMS) shown in Fig. 1. These case study areas were chosen as
they share similar institutional and political contexts, but different
demographic and economic proﬁles. The ACT is highly urbanised,
and contains Australia’s capital Canberra (population 340,000),
with a high proportion of residents employed in Federal or State
government. By contrast, GMS is a 1-h drive from Canberra, across
the border into New South Wales. It is a predominantly rural area,
with employment focussed on grazing agriculture, and with the
regional town Goulburn (population 21,000) providing supporting
services.
Fig. 2 outlines the key components of the ACR research design,
split into 3 phases that spanned 2008 to 2010. The following sub-
sections outline the main components of each phase, with
subsequent discussion focusing on results form Phases 2 and 3.
3.1. Phase 1: developing climate change scenarios
This research constructed a series of climate scenarios to
represent impacts of projected climate changes within the ACR
over a time frame up to 2100. The ACR regional scale was chosen as
research suggests that ﬁner-scale impact modelling may be more
meaningful to individuals if they can connect it with the spaces and
scales of their everyday lives (Shackley and Deanwood, 2002).
The scenarios were developed using the Commonwealth
Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research Organisation’s (CSIRO) OzClim
model.2 They were based on ‘medium’ and ‘high’ emissions
trajectories associated with the SRES A1B and the SRES A1FI
scenarios respectively (see Appendix A for emissions trajectories
and time slices). As a reference point, a Baseline scenario for 1990
was developed based on the average climate over a 30-year period
(1976–2005). Two further scenarios (Medium and High) were then
created with climate parameters produced for two timeline slices.
The ﬁrst time-slice was 2050: in addition, a second time-slice at
2100 was included.
The impacts on various climate parameters for the scenarios
were then produced for the 2050 and 2100 time slices. These
covered a range of climatic variables, e.g. temperature, rainfall,
growing range for key species and climatic domain representation.
In most cases the information was produced in map form, except
where indicated as data. The changes to scenario parameters in
map, graphical, and schematic form were animated between the
time-slices. Finally, all the maps and data were translated into
iWork’09 KeyNote presentations (one presentation per emissions
trajectory, i.e. Baseline, Medium and High), to be used in interviews
with members of the ACR public to gauge their reactions.
3.2. Phase 2: measuring the impact of climate change through
scenario interviews
During May 2010 a total of 103 face-to-face interviews were
held in the ACT and GMS. Interviewees were recruited via mail out
invitations, sent to 2300 households in the ACR selected randomly
from the electoral roll. A total of 262 people responded registered
an interest in participating (188 from the ACT, 74 from the GMS: a
response rate of 11%).
The ﬁnal 103 interviewees (72 from the ACT, 31 from the GMS)
were selected by researchers, based on (a) responses to a
questionnaire accompanying invitations that asked questions
about beliefs and attitudes towards climate change; and (b) basic
socio-demographic information, e.g. age and education. In terms of
(a), the selection process involved a random stratiﬁcation approach
Fig. 2. ACR research design.
2 The CSIRO OzClim model contains patterns of regional changes in climate
projected from 23 global climate models archived at the Program for Climate Model
Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI). The model enables users to select from six
SRES scenarios (taken from the ‘Special Report on Emissions’) and two commonly
used CO2 concentration stabilisation scenarios to generate projections for any of the
available global climate models (Garnaut, 2008; IPCC, 2000; Stern, 2006).
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to capture a range of beliefs regarding the ‘reality’ of climate
change, in an attempt to mirror as close as possible Australian
public opinion (see Ong et al., 2010). This process also involved
selecting across a range of demographic characteristics (gender,
age, education level) to achieve a distribution reﬂecting the wider
Australian population. The results are shown in Table 1, which also
outlines the characteristics of the participants selected from to
participate in the deliberative forum (see below).
As the table shows, there was an under-representation of
individuals under 30 years old, and women. when both are
compared to the broader Australian public. There was also an over-
representation of individuals with a Bachelor degree or postgrad-
uate education—in part because the ACT is the most educated
demographic within Australia. These differences could only be
partially stratiﬁed out in the participant selection, while main-
taining a range of perspectives on climate change.
All interviews lasted for at least 2 h, and were recorded for
qualitative analysis purposes. Interviews followed a pre-estab-
lished protocol, summarised in Table 2.
Q methodology was used to gauge both current and possible
future perceptions of climate change. Q methodology is a now
well-established approach to exploring an issue through the lens of
discourses (Barry and Proops, 1999; Brown, 1980). Here, dis-
courses can be understood as shared meanings that coalesce
around particular ‘story lines’ (Dryzek, 1993, 1994, 1997; Dryzek
and Niemeyer, 2008; Hajer, 1995). These story lines enable the
expression of personal beliefs and attitudes in ways that others will
comprehend (Bankoff, 2001). At the same time, they are
fundamental to shaping individuals’ beliefs and attitudes (Darier,
1999) making them concurrently shared and personal ways of
comprehending the world. Indeed, Q methodology has been used
to identify key discourses around ecological citizenship and
climate change in Canada (Wolf et al., 2009), as well as feelings
of salience and personal efﬁcacy around climate change in the UK
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007). However, while most studies using Q
methodology identify key discourses as static entities, this
research used it as a dynamic tool to track the discursive changes
over research Phases 2 and 3. The aim was to collect data about the
social dynamics of responses to the issue; how it might unfold as
climate changes; and how both of these factors might differ under
deliberative conditions.
The application of Q methodology involved collecting statements
about climate change adaptation from preliminary interviews, mass
media, and parliamentary records. Then a subsample of 33
statements was selected after being piloted in late 2009 (see
Appendix B for full statement list). The Q interview involved
participants sorting the 33 statements along a scale from +5 (agree
strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly): a process called a ‘Q Sort’. The
resulting Q sorts were analysed using inverted factor analysis to
identify the shared discourses (or factors, to use the language of Q
methodology).
Thus, Q Sorts were performed by all 103 interviewees (Phase 2)
after viewing each scenario presentation (Baseline, Medium, High),
as well as by all participants at the start and end of the deliberative
process (Phase 3). Finally, in October 2010, 20 individuals who had
taken part in the scenario interviews only (i.e. not the deliberative
process) were reinterviewed, to examine whether any noted
changes during the interviews had been sustained or altered in the
ensuing months (Phase 3).
3.3. Phase 3: the deliberative forum
After the above interviews were completed, 40 individuals were
selected to participate in a deliberative forum to take place at the
}
Table 2
Protocol for scenario interviews.
Interview stage Data collected
1. Introduction Questions on attitudes to and perceptions regarding climate change
Qualitative data (interview transcripts)
2. Baseline Opinion Charting a. Policy preference exercise
b. Q-sort
c. Willingness to Pay (WTP) exercise
3. Medium Scenario Presentation and Discussion of the Medium Scenario
4. Medium Scenario Opinion Chart a. Policy preference exercise
b. Q-sort
5. High Scenario Presentation and Discussion of the High Scenario
6. High Scenario Opinion Chart a. Policy preference exercise
b. Q-sort
7. Conclusion a. WTP (to avoid scenario outcomes; Med & High)
b. Semi-structured discussion on experiences and thoughts
Table 1
Summary of participants selected for participation in the climate change scenarios interviews and deliberative forum.
Numbers Percentages Australian population
Interview Forum Interview Forum
Gender
Male 57 21 55% 60% 49%
Female 46 14 45% 40% 51%
Age
18–29 21 6 14% 17% 29%
30–44 23 5 22% 14% 27%
45–59 32 14 30% 40% 24%
60–75 27 10 26% 29% 19%
Highest education level
Junior secondary education 8 2 8% 6% 13%
Senior secondary education 26 9 25% 26% 24%
All diploma or certiﬁcate 36 13 35% 37% 33%
Bachelor degree 22 9 21% 26% 16%
Postgraduate study 10 2 10% 6% 4%
Other/NA 1 0 1% 0% 9%
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end of May 2010, using a random stratiﬁcation of the above
interviewees. The aim here was to achieve a discursively
representative sample (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008) across the
main discourses identiﬁed in Phase 2 (outlined below), as well as
broad demographic representation across the categories shown in
Table 1. The relatively low proportion of females (40%) and
younger participants (>30) reﬂects the difﬁculty in recruiting from
these groups for the research, particularly in respect to participa-
tion in a demanding 3-day process. But it also reﬂects the difﬁculty
in achieving a discursively representative sample within these
demographic constraints, particularly in respect to individuals
who do not believe that climate change is happening or a problem
(who tend to fall into discourse A, reported below). For example,
climate sceptics in our sample are predominantly older men
although attempts were made to ﬁnd sceptics within other
categories to participate in the deliberative forum. Thus, although
the selection process used has shortcomings, one advantage of the
‘discursive’ approach is that it helps to ensure a range of attitudes
amongst the participants that cannot be adequately captured using
demographic categories alone (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008).
Of the 40 individuals invited, 35 completed the forum, which
ran for 4 days in total. For the ﬁrst 2 days (Friday 28 and Saturday
29 May) all participants talked, listened and ate together. On day 3,
they were split into their respective geographical locations, as the
focus of discussion was policy responses and the ACT and GMS
have different political and institutional contexts. Thus, on Sunday
30 May all GMS participants met in Goulburn: and on Saturday 5
June, all ACT participants met in Canberra. A timetable for these 4
days is shown in Table 3.
Overall the forum aimed to enable participants to learn more
about the issues featured in the scenarios through presentations by
academic and policy experts. In addition, it aimed to provide the
opportunity for participants to debate with each other and
question experts about the facts and values underpinning climate
change debates via ‘communicative learning’ (Petts, 2007): argued
as key to fostering positive action on issues such as climate change
(Marx et al., 2007).
4. Charting climate change discourse: results from scenario
interviews
The remainder of this paper discusses the results from the Q
sorts undertaken in Phases 2 and 3, examining the different
impacts the scenario interviews and deliberation had on poten-
tially fostering adaptive capacity.
To begin, the analysis of Q sorts during the Phase 2 scenario
interviews revealed four main discourses, labelled here as:
A. Self-assured Scepticism
B. Governance Imperative
C. Assured Pragmatism
D. Alarmed Defeatism
The main characteristics of each of the discourses are
schematically represented in Fig. 3 in the form of four overlapping
spheres. Each sphere contains the main elements of each discourse
as paraphrased statements used in the Q sort: the numbers in
brackets after each statement corresponds to its number in
Appendix B. Features that are shared by two or more discourses are
shown in the areas of overlap. The diagram is schematic, rather
than precise or analytic. The spheres are drawn to permit the
placement of statements according to whether they are associated
with one or more discourses, based on the factor z-scores resulting
from the inverted factor analysis.
The following discussion describes each of the discourses
in turn.
4.1. Discourse A: Self-Assured Scepticism
This discourse includes those individuals who do not believe in
human-induced climate change or who believe that it is occurring
but not anthropogenic. Many are doubtful about the veracity of
climate science, and overall there is a belief that not enough
information exists to sustain the anthropogenic argument:
perspectives that arguably reﬂect the numerous barriers to climate
change action identiﬁed elsewhere using Q methodology (Lor-
enzoni et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 2009). The following quote from one
participant reﬂects this perspective:
‘‘I remember when I grew up everyone was talking about global
cooling. It’s bizarre how in 20 years it has reversed.’’ (Male, mid-
40s)
While such scepticism speaks to uncertainty surrounding
climate change projections, participants loaded on this discourse
have a strong ‘meta-cognitive conﬁdence’ (Scannell and Grouzet,
2010) in their own conclusions. They do express concern about the
planet and future generations and a willingness to ‘do their bit’. But
action, and, to some extent, a belief in climate change, is forestalled
by profound lack of trust in existing institutions and key actors in
the climate change debate, i.e. the media, government and
scientists. Problematically, they want these actors to get on and
‘‘sort the issue out’’ while not trusting them to do so. However,
such tensions are reconciled by the belief that climate change is not
really a major issue and there is no need to panic, creating a general
willingness to act underscored by justiﬁable reasons for inaction.
4.2. Discourse B: Governance Imperative
Discourse B most closely echoes the majority sentiment in the
wider Australian community (Ong et al., 2010). It represents the
view that climate change is a genuine anthropogenic phenomenon
and that direct government action is required, as market forces
alone will not be able to address the problem. As one participant
loaded on this discourse commented:
‘‘So if the government works in the public good, shouldn’t they
be the ones to lead the way, rather than business forces? Isn’t
Table 3
Timetable of the deliberative process.
Day Location Activities
1 The Australian National
University, Canberra
 Ice-breaker
 Initial Opinion Charting
 Setting deliberative ground-rules
 Presentations (science and socio-economic
aspects of climate change)
 Small group-break out sessions
and questions to the ﬂoor
 Group meal in the evening
2 The Australian National
University, Canberra
 Presentations (bio-physical impacts
and international politics)
 Group exercise (adaptation and
mitigation)
 Group discussion approaches
to adaptation and mitigation
3 Goulburn Workers’
Club, Goulburn,
New South Wales
(15 Goulburn-Mulwaree
Participants)
 Group deliberation:
priorities for action
 Group deliberation: recommended
policy approaches
The Australian National
University, Canberra
(20 ACT participants)
 Feedback on recommendations from
local policy makers
 Finalizing recommendations
 Final Opinion Charting
 Feedback and reﬂection on process and
research
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there room to have more informed decisions rather than just
economic?’’ (Female, early 20s)
In this discourse, a perceived failure of leadership was a
signiﬁcant feature, along with the belief that government efforts to
engage people with climate change had been somewhat tokenistic.
As one individual commented, when discussing the lack of two-
way communication on this issue between government and the
public, ‘‘If you really want to hear from the public, you have to
invest in hearing from us’’ (Female, late 30s). Indeed, there was a
strong feeling that it was the responsibility of the government to
act: a feeling shared by many other Australian (e.g. see Ong et al.,
2010). The serious and pressing nature of this issue was expressed
by many associated with this discourse, often in quite dramatic
tones, such as ‘‘If this was a war, we would have gone on to rations
by now.’’ (Female, mid 20s).
This resonates with the strong belief that Australia must take
action, as it has both a pragmatic and moral imperative to act and
lead on climate change policy. Indeed, participants associated with
this discourse are willing to take personal action to address this
issue, and believe that individuals can make a positive difference.
In line with this, educational programmes are also favoured,
associated with relative optimism about the impact they can have.
However, this discourse was underpinned by the need for political
leadership: without which, individuals are less likely themselves
to respond to attempts to adapt to climate change.
4.3. Discourse C: Assured Pragmatism
Like discourse B, discourse C accepts that climate change is real
and anthropogenic. Much is shared with B yet it is slightly more
indifferent to the need to take action because of technological
optimism and also because (like A) there is a strong belief in our
capacity to adapt. This position echoes discourses of ‘ecological
modernization’ with a ‘win-win’ approach to addressing environ-
mental issues (Janicke, 2008). As one participant stated:
‘‘There’s always going to be more improvement in technology,
so I think we’ll be able to ﬁnd a way to get through [climate
change].’’ (Male, early 20s)
In the face of this technological optimism, there is a good deal of
cynicism about the potential for individual actions to have any real
impact. There is also a sense that Australia has both an interest in,
and a duty towards, ﬁnding a solution to this problem, but the
emphasis is more on collective responses, under strong leadership
thus providing a strong personal incentive not to take action
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007).
4.4. Discourse D: Alarmist Defeatism
The ﬁnal discourse embodies an emphatic belief that climate
change is real and here, and a serious threat, a sentiment captured
by the following quotes:
‘‘We’re looking at a six-degree rise by 2100. That is where
civilisation as we know it cannot cope.’’ (Female, early 20s)
‘‘We are well on the endangered species list and I’m not joking
. . . there is going to be total social and environmental collapse.’’
(Female, late 50s)
Discourse D thus echoes a catastrophic and apocalyptic view,
wherein climate change marks the end of civilisation as we know it
(Risby, 2008; Segnit and Ereaut, 2007). There is a strong sense of
‘giving up’ on measures such as education and a deﬁnite degree of
pessimism about the possibility of mitigating climate change given
the enormity of the challenge that is undergirded and perpetuated
by global forces such as ‘‘Corporate Globalization’’ (as one
participant labelled it): a sentiment that echoes Wolf et al.’s
(2009) discourse of the ‘Systemist’ who argues that climate change
is one symptom of a fundamental problem with the global modus
operandi.
Fig. 3. Discourses from ACR scenario interviews.
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4.5. The impact of climate change interview scenarios on discourses
Fig. 4 shows the overall level of inﬂuence of each of the above
discourses amongst interview participants. It shows the average
factor loading, which measures the level of agreement, and
correlation between individual Q-sorts and the discourses at each
of the study stages. The lines in the graph also plot the number of
individuals who signiﬁcantly agree with that discourse.3
From Fig. 4 it can be seen that the inﬂuence of discourses A and
C decrease compared to the Baseline, as the severity of the climate
change scenarios increase, shown in the ﬁrst three bars for each
discourse. Discourses B and D, by contrast, increase in inﬂuence.
Fig. 5 shows the migrations of individual participants across the
discourses between the Baseline and High emissions scenario
during Phase 2 interviews. The arrows plot movement between the
Baseline and High scenario positions of individuals (the stronger an
individual is uniquely associated with a discourse, the further
towards the corners they are positioned). Where an individual is
associated with one or more discourses they are located in the
overlap. An individual who is not associated with any discourse is
shown outside the ﬁgure near the discourse they are most closely
associated with. Those deeply sceptical about climate change are
shown by the hashed arrows and are strongly negatively
associated with B, D or both; and weakly associated with A.
Overall the above ﬁgures show that climate change scepticism
decreased through the scenario interviews, dramatically so in
some cases. Most of the movement between the baseline and high
scenario is in a southeast direction from discourse A towards D.
Those individuals who begin strongly loaded on B tend to stay
there.
In B and D discourses for the High emissions scenario—and, to a
lesser extent Medium—there is a strong increase in belief that we
need to act and act now. As discussed below, there is a good deal of
potential for a strongly maladaptive public response in both
discourses: particularly in discourse D, which represents a
withdrawal from collective attempts to deal with climate change.
Discourse B is less problematic, but does embody a difﬁcult
situation from a governance point of view as there is a strong
demand for deﬁnitive action from government, while at the same
time the low levels of trust in government.
Do the scenario interviews have a lasting effect on participants?
To test this, 20 follow-up interviews were performed, showing
very little change compared to the Baseline—indicated by second
last bar in the graph shown in Fig. 4. That this happened in an
intriguing comment on the mostly unsustained impact of climate
scenarios: discussed in more detail elsewhere (see Hobson and
Niemeyer, submitted).
5. The impact of deliberation on climate adaptation discourses
What difference then does deliberation makes to the above
discourses, in terms of potential to improve adaptive capacity? In
Fig. 4 above, the ﬁnal bar for each discourse shows their respective
strengths following the deliberative forum. It shows an increase in
discourse B (though not to the same level as seen for the High
scenario) and a relatively sharp increase in discourse C.
What Fig. 4 does not show is that these movements reﬂect a
strong increase in consensus amongst the deliberative participants
as is often the case with group deliberation (Niemeyer, 2011).4
Fig. 6 shows that this increased consensus results from a
convergence of most participants around discourse B; the
intersection between B and C; or the intersection between B
and A. Discourse C has ostensibly increased, but a closer inspection
of all associated participants reveals that, while they conform to
many features associated with C, they do not agree with its
standout feature, i.e. the belief in the ability of technology to
address adaptation issues. The smaller number of arrows in the
ﬁgure compared to Fig. 5 is due to the smaller number of
participants completing the deliberative process, compared to the
scenario interviews.
However, further analysis reveals that the above discourses do
not describe well the post-deliberative situation. Indeed, delibera-
Fig. 4. Levels of association with scenario interview discourses.
3 The level of signiﬁcance was set at a correlation of 0.44, corresponding to a 99%
conﬁdence level, where the standard error is calculated using SE ¼ 1= ﬃﬃﬃnp , where
n = 33 is the number of statements used in the Q-sort.
4 The average (Pearson) correlation between the Q sorts of deliberative
participants increased from 0.48 to 0.60 between the baseline and post-deliberative
stages.
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tion appeared to change the discursive landscape as part of an
increased overall consensus. Thus, a second analysis was
conducted using only the post deliberative Q sorts, which resulted
in four new discourses. Two of these (A0 and B0) are closely related—
but different in important ways—to discourses A and B from the
ﬁrst analysis. The second two (E and F) are entirely new discourses
that arose out of the deliberative process.
Thenewpost-deliberativediscoursesareschematicallydescribed
in Fig. 7 in the same manner as the scenario discourses in Fig. 3 (see
Appendix A for factor scores). These new discourses are labelled as:
Fig. 5. Interview discourse migration: schematic representation of changes to participants’ discourse association between the Baseline and High emissions scenario.
Fig. 6. Discourse migration: schematic representation of changes to participants’ discourse association between the Baseline scenario and post-deliberation.
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A0 Accommodating Scepticism
B0 Governance and Engagement Imperative
E Collective Action Imperative
F Adaptive Reassurance
The increased overlap in Fig. 7 reﬂects the much closer
relationship between the four discourses than was previously
the case, in turn reﬂecting the increased consensus amongst the
participants.
5.1. Discourse A0: Accommodating Scepticism
Discourse A0 is similar to the original A except it is more
accommodating, e.g. increased willingness to engage with a wider
variety of climate change policies and practices such as paying for
greenhouse emissions. There was more optimism that personal
actions are worthwhile and can make a difference; and less belief
that they can be swayed by comments in the media that cast doubt
on climate change. These ﬁndings suggest that the meta-cognitive
conﬁdence (Scannell and Grouzet, 2010) noted above in relation to
discourse A may have been strengthened through taking part in
deliberation, but that Meta-Cognitive Certainty (i.e. judgements
about the likelihood of a given climate outcome) may have been
weakened somewhat, enabling participants to engage more with
the possibility that action may be necessary.
5.2. Discourse B0: Government and Engagement Imperative
Discourse B0 is largely similar to the original B, but adopts a
much stronger ‘soft governance’ (Brandsen et al., 2006) position,
favouring engagement and education. The original stance against
the use of market forces is softened suggesting recognition that a
broad ‘response space’ (Brandsen et al., 2006) is indeed required.
However, B0 is slightly less optimistic than B. There is an increase in
the belief of the futility of personal action and that it may already
be too late to stop climate change. There is also less trust in the
media, with comments during deliberation about its biased nature
and lack of interest in ‘good news’ stories. As one participant put it:
‘‘I’m a reasonably informed person, and I didn’t know a fraction
of the stuff I’ve learned in the last few days. So the media I think
have got a lot to answer for. Apart from the lack of leadership
from the government, even if they did have a message, it’s not
going to come through, because the media is obsessed with
drama and conﬂict, and they don’t seem to have the integrity
just to tell the story. And this is the biggest story that’s
happening. And all of it’s open to doubt, that people have
expressed even here, and the media takes that doubt all out of
proportion, so you don’t realise that the science is as ﬁrm as it
is’’ (Male, early 60s)
Primarily, discourse B0 focuses on forms of community
engagement and leadership. For example, one deliberative
participant talked about attempts to create community leaders
amongst the Australian indigenous community, as a possible
template for garnering grass roots action on climate change.
Amongst talk of ‘bringing others along’, there was also a strong
acknowledgement of the need to not utilise fear and negative
framings to motivate engagement with climate change: a point
well made in the literature to date (Moser, 2010; O’Neill and
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). As one participant put it:
‘‘Is there a tension between the need to raise public concern to
get action about climate change and the affect of this social and
psychological stress on individuals? So I see it as a tension . . .
we’ve got to make people aware, so you tell them all the doom
and gloom stuff. But then there are issues of stress levels in
individuals, it affects their health because they’re over-
whelmed’’. (Female, late 60s)
In addition, there was an expressed concern here about how
one can communicate climate change without vested interests
confusing the issue, with one participant commenting that we
need to ‘think about ways to talk about the climate change
without the politics interfering and clouding it all’ (Female, mid
40s).
Fig. 7. Climate change discourses: post-deliberation.
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5.3. Discourse E: Collective Action Imperative
Although discourse E is not the strongest of the four discourses
following deliberation, it best represents the areas of consensus
amongst deliberative forum participants. It shares with A0
optimism that it is not too late to do anything and that we can
adapt. It also shares with B0 (and F) the belief that anthropogenic
climate change is a real and serious issue that needs to be
confronted. In contrast to B0, discourse E favours more traditional
forms of governance via the instruments of the law.
What is different from B0 is the presence of optimism about our
ability to adapt to coming changes, with a lesser tendency towards
feeling that the issue is out of control and that individuals can
make a difference. However, unlike B0 (and B), discourse E
expressed a good deal of optimism about the prospects for
adaptation in the face of much stronger perception about the
reality of climate change. But this optimism does not translate into
apathy or some sort of blind hope that humans can muddle
through. Discourse E is about action. It represents a position not
stymied by many of the barriers to action identiﬁed elsewhere
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007), including personal willingness to alter
lifestyles. This a sentiment echoes Wolf et al.’s (2009) ‘Communi-
tarian’ discourse, i.e. being a responsible citizen and acting now,
while viewing climate change as one symptom of a bigger problem.
As one participant put it:
‘‘I want to go mitigation all the way, and if that means that I can’t
get my new car or whatever the consequence is to help the future
of the planet, if I don’t just think about it as Canberra, I’m talking
about the whole planet, I will do it. And I totally believe in a
democracy, or a government. That’s who creates this world, and
who gives the laws, so as a citizen of the planet, I have to agree
what the politician, or try to go with what the politician says.’’
This quote suggests a form of cosmopolitan environmental
ethic (Barry, 2005) that links citizenship to justice, i.e. the need to
move beyond self-interest to the common good (Dobson, 2003).
From this perspective, it is not just down to laws and politicians to
lead the way, but is a collective and other-focussed endeavour that
has fairness amongst humans and also fairness to ‘the planet’ at its
core.
5.4. Discourse F: Adaptive Reassurance
The ability to, and hope for, adaptation became a key theme for
those associated with discourse F. It was expressed as a generalised
idea that encompassed the (quite possibly wishful) thinking that,
through some non-speciﬁc forms of adaptation, future generations
will be able to cope. As one deliberative participant commented:
‘‘It still concerns me that our children and grandchildren are
going to move into this and we have no idea of what they’re
going to be facing and that’s saddening for me. [Pause] But, I
imagine that in some ways our children will only know this and
so the hope is that they will grow up with it and they’ll have the
ideas anyway. They’ll adapt more readily because this is all they
have known, so this what we left them with and this is how
they’re going to deal with it.’’ (Female, mid-40s)
Such statements can be interpreted as a form of denial, or at
least a coping mechanism to deal with the discomfort that this
participant feels on leaving a negative inheritance for her progeny
(Norgaard, 2006).
More speciﬁcally, the idea was ﬂoated that only particular types
of people would be able to adapt successfully. For example, one
participant noted that:
‘‘For those people who have not lived through years of drought
and bushﬁres, they may not know what to do. We (Australians)
adapt, but I don’t think we should expect everyone to be able to,
as they don’t know a thing about it.’’ (Female, 60s, follow-up
interview)
This comment was made in the context of a conversation about
the intrinsic toughness of Australian rural people and their ability to
cope in the face of adversity. It suggests that cultural icons, such as
the ‘Aussie battler’5 evoked here—and their links to self-identity—
are an important component of responses to climate change (Smith
et al., 2007): an issue the Q statements could not measure but would
make interesting further research around response to climate
change in various socio-political and cultural contexts.
6. Implications of post-deliberative discourses for adaptive
capacity
These four new discourses crystallised during the process of
deliberation, illustrated in Fig. 8, which shows the levels of
association attributable to them at all the stages of the study. All
four discourses experience a signiﬁcant increase in association
following deliberation. Thus, deliberation does change individual
positions regarding climate change: that is, there is less scepticism,
more desire for action, and a greater willingness to act. It also alters
the nature of the collective debate, as more people move closer
together in terms of their position within the discourses.
What then does this imply about the impact deliberation can
have on fostering public adaptive capacity? To return to the 5
questions posed in Section 2 of this paper—around recognition,
knowledge, motivation, and personal and political efﬁcacy—some
can be explored through qualitative data gathered during this
research. For example, in terms of increased information and
knowledge, positive evidence exists. While this research did not
test factual climate change knowledge amongst participants (see
Sterman and Sweeney, 2007) some participants self-reported they
had learnt a lot and felt more able to formulate coherent positions
on the issues discussed, having been exposed to different attitudes
and ideas for action. For example, one participant reﬂected that:
‘‘I know a lot more, a hell of a lot more, and I don’t feel anywhere
near as threatened as before. I don’t. Because I think it’s
achievable. It just means we put a few things on hold, get our
priorities right, and look after this, otherwise it will be too late.’’
(Male, mate 40s)
In the same session, another participant was also positive about
the impact that the deliberative process had on her.
‘‘I must congratulate everybody, because I think we’ve all
moved. I mean, I must speak just for myself, but I feel I have
moved a great distance since that interview. Because I’d
reached a plateau, given the source of my disappointments. So I
felt stymied. I don’t feel stymied now, I don’t feel threatened, I
think I have hope, I have optimism. And I believe too I’ve
changed.’’ (Female, late 60s)
Beyond these self-reported changes, the above discourse
descriptions can be examined in relation to the 5 adaptive
capacity questions outlined in Section 2. Table 4 thus summarises
5 The term ‘Aussie Battler’ has its roots deep in Australian folklore. Coming into
common use around the 1890s, it stands for an ‘Individual who, despite having few
material advantages, struggles against overwhelming odds with stoic humour . . . In
more recent times the concept has become a powerful icon of popular nationalism
in the phrase ‘the little Aussie battler’ (Davey and Seal, 2003: 31).
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these adaptive capacity determinants and their relationships to
both the end-of-interview discourse (A–D) and the post-delibera-
tive discourses (A0–F). It presents an overall evaluation of the levels
of adaptive capacity each discourse suggests. However, as Q
method measures adherence to particular statements that can
stand as proxies for adaptive capacity determinants (e.g. motiva-
tion, trust in political institutions) but are not actual quantitative
measures of these determinants that can be tracked over time, the
evaluations presented in Table 4 are provisional and open to
debate: which, given the dearth of literature around adaptive
capacity and deliberation is a debate this paper aims to stimulate
further. For the sake of consistency however, a evaluative criteria
was created wherein ‘Low’ adaptive capacity is given to discourses
that are negative on all 5 determinants, and/or where any changes
during the scenario interviews and/or deliberation remained so:
‘Medium’ for discourses that were positive on at least 2–4
determinants and where some positive changes had taken place:
and ﬁnally ‘High’ was given to any discourses that were positive on
all the 5 determinants and remained (or become more) so after
either the interviews and/or deliberation.
Thus Table 4 suggests some discourses do appear to contain
greater potential adaptive capacity than others. For example, out of
the interview discourses only B seems to have potential in terms of
responding positively to new knowledge about climate change. For
the post-deliberative discourses, individuals loaded on A0 became
more willing to consider a broader suites of policy options and
personal input. However, they remain sceptical about some
aspects of climate change; became more sceptical about climate
modelling; and had low levels of trust towards key governance
actors. Thus, although there has been a move away from strong
scepticism, A0 suggests that there exists low levels of support for
challenging and/or controversial climate change policies.
Discourse B0 had the greatest number of participants loaded on
it, and is positive in terms of recognising the need for a broad
‘response space’ (Table 4) in governing climate change. However,
there were some potentially problematic elements, in terms of
fostering adaptive capacity. For example, negative assessments of
the governance status quo increased through deliberation,
suggesting an erosion of aspects of political capital, which includes
trust in public ofﬁcials and current governance systems (Booth and
Richard, 1998). At the same time, there was an increased focus on
fostering social capital through widespread public engagement.
However, discussion here centred on ‘other people’ taking the lead,
rather than an emphasis on personal involvement and leadership.
This is a reasonable stance, given that ‘bottom up’ change needs
institutional support (see Folke et al., 2005). However, this is all
taking place in a national context that has seen moderate climate
change policy initiatives fail6; weak national emissions reduction
targets set7; and environmental policies severely downgraded as
an over-all national political priority (ABC News, 2011). Indeed, the
need for ‘uniﬁed elites’ to take the lead in Australia climate change
has been noted (Tranter, 2011), suggesting it remains a key but
currently lacking facet of collective responses to climate change in
Australia. Indeed, the corrosive effects of this political context can
be seen in the following quote from one deliberative participant.
Reﬂecting on how he feels, six months after participating in the
forum, he comments that:
‘‘I was more optimistic 6 months ago as I thought things were
starting to change but nothing seems to be changing. As if this
carries on for 5–10 years and the temperature changes as they
predict then we’re really going to have a problem.’’ (Male, mid
40s)
Indeed, when some deliberative participants met in December
2010 for an informal feedback session on the research results from
Fig. 8. Levels of association with post-deliberative discourses.
6 For example, a ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’ White Paper was published
in 2008, laying out targets for 2020. An Emissions Trading Scheme bill followed,
introduced to the Federal parliament in 2009. The bill was rejected by 42–30 votes
in the Senate (see Tranter, 2011). In response, the Labor government said it would
not introduce an ETS until 2013 and then, only if there is strong international
movement on this front. This issue at the time received a great deal of media
attention, as in response, the Opposition called for a double dissolution election.
7 The current Australian Labor government has stated that it does not intend to
set national targets above 5% emissions cut by 2020 unless ‘the level of global
ambition becomes sufﬁciently clear’ and ‘the credibility of those commitments and
actions is established’ (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efﬁciency, 2010:
no page), showing a ‘wait and see’ approach.
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this project—during which they were shown where they were
positioned in the discourses—one participant commented:
‘‘I am in the ‘government imperative’ [discourse] but if you look
at it realistically, that is not going to happen. The people are not
in control: it is business. It is market forces: that’s what’s
dictating the terms.’’ (Male, mid-60s)
This reﬂected the potential already noted in the high scenario
movement from B to D to despair about, and withdraw from,
efforts to deal with a changing climate. However, there is some
cause for optimism about the potential of deliberation fostering
adaptive capacity. It is argued that, of all the discourses discussed
in this paper, the post-deliberative discourse E (Collective Action
Imperative) has the most potential. Here, the focus on strong
political leadership is matched by a willingness to make personal
changes to lifestyles and attitudes, echoing the ﬂexible and self-
organised forms of association that the adaptive capacity literature
suggests as desirable (e.g. see Folke et al., 2005; Kalikoski et al.,
2010). Thus, overall, the aim is to lessen the occurrence and
impacts of climate change, not just for personal beneﬁt, but for the
‘whole world’, as one participant put it.
7. Concluding comments
This paper began by questioning the difference that deliberat-
ing about climate change can make to fostering aspects of adaptive
capacity. Through exploring and interweaving quantitative analy-
sis (i.e. data from multiple Q sorts in research Phases 2 and 3) and
qualitative data (drawn from the interviews, deliberative forum,
and follow-up meetings) it argues that deliberation does have an
impact on individuals’ perceptions on climate change. Several
sceptical participants became less so: a trend that did not appear so
strongly for those who took part in the interviews only. And the
position that the government and the government alone needed to
take the lead and act became softened somewhat, with other actors
and governance mechanisms being considered viable and desir-
able. This latter change arguably opens up the ‘response space’,
wherein participants might now be more inclined to accept a broad
range of policy initiatives on climate change, beyond the narrowly
deﬁned debate in Australia in the years leading up to the
deliberative process, which focussed on emissions trading and
the ‘failure’ of the United Nations 2009 Conference in Copenhagen.
But there is every reason to be cautious about these results. For
one, the two case studies discussed here would beneﬁt from
further examples, drawn from across Australia and globally to
enable the teasing out of the impact of geographical and cultural
contexts in discourse changes. Also, there are methodological
issues that require further research. For example, in this paper, the
discourses mapped out are taken as partially indicative of the
prevailing worldviews of research participants. However, this does
not suggest any ﬁrm conclusions can be drawn about future
actions. Although discourses do formulate ones dispositions and
therefore one’s propensities to act, they can in no way be taken as
ﬁrmly predictive of current or future behaviour, i.e. adaptive
action. Plus, as the adaptive capacity literature shows, there are
many other determinants at play, including how capacities are
distributed within and across societies.
However, this research can offer some insight into issues
around deliberation and governing climate change. As already
noted the majority of participants were post-deliberatively
clustered about B0 but not E. However, one-third of participants
were signiﬁcantly (though not uniquely) loaded on E, with a
general movement towards F throughout the deliberative process.
This suggests that, perhaps given more time and space to learn,
think and deliberate, more participants might have moved further
towards the ‘Collective Action Imperative’ discourse. Yet, how
realistic is it to suggest yet more time spent deliberating, for these
particular individuals, and in general? This is not only a pragmatic
question of research participants ‘burning out’, but an issue of
deliberation being embedded in particular socio-political contexts
and economies (see Hobson, 2009): particularly one that is not
responding to the issue of climate change at the speed and in the
direction research participants felt it should. Given the current lack
of political leadership on climate change in Australia, that
continues on past ‘no regrets’ trajectories (see Bulkeley, 2001),
the optimism and feelings of collective understanding some
Table 4
Determinants of adaptive capacity and their relationship to interview (A–D) and post-deliberative (A0–F) discourses.
Adaptive
capacity
determinants
A: Self-Assured
scepticism
B: Governance
Imperative
C: Assured
Pragmatism
D: Alarmed
Defeatism
A0: Accommodating
Scepticism
B0: Governance
and Engagement
Imperative
E: Collective
Action
Imperative
F: Adaptive
Reassurance
1. Recognition Very little Yes: is an
major issue
Some: but
not overly
concerned
Strong
recognition:
despondency
Yes: will
consider a
wider range
of policies
Yes: need for
governance
strengthened
Yes: need to
both mitigate
and adapt
Yes, but very
generalised
2. Knowledge Some: but
viewed
through
sceptical
lens
Yes: has
heightened
need to
take action
Little: but
climate change
is not a
major issue
Yes: conﬁrms
current belief
systems
Some: climate
change as
anthropogenic
and potentially
problematic
Yes: heightened
sense of urgency
Yes: sense of
both urgency
and collective
danger increased
Yes: optimistic
about a
bility to adapt
3. Motivation Very little Little: focus
on political
inaction
In a abstract
sense: little
commitment
Not in the face
of social collapse
Slight: will take
personal action
but little strong
commitment
Focussed on
others but
willing
to take part
Yes: willingness
to ‘go without’
Not clear:
relying on
adaptation
4. Personal
Efﬁcacy
Not relevant Low, due to 3. Low: cynical
about action
Irrelevant Slight Low: not
optimistic
High: ‘we can
do it’
Slight and
general
3. Political
Efﬁcacy
High levels of
distrust in the
experts and
institutions
Need leadership
but it is not
forthcoming
Technology
will sort it out
Becomes
meaningless
as society
collapses
Still distrustful
of institutions;
increased
scepticism of
modelling
Focus on
engagement:
dissatisfaction
with the
status quo
Environment-al
citizenship:
everyone
doing their bit
Government
to take the
lead: citizens
will adapt
somehow
Overall
evaluation
Low Medium Low Low Low Medium High Medium
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deliberative participants feel once they ‘leave the room’ can give
rise to greater despondency than before deliberation. Thus, deﬁnite
caution has to be applied in taking broad statements about the
merits of deliberation at face value, especially when the prevailing
public discourse remains non-deliberative and distorted (Nie-
meyer, 2011).
Thus, further critical, inter-disciplinary and mixed methods
research is needed to tease out the values of utilising deliberation
as a key plank of building adaptive capacity. Without doubt
deliberation does make a difference: more so, than just providing
individuals with climate change information, as in the scenario
interviews. But arguing that speciﬁc public deliberative platforms
can offer an effective and efﬁcient means of fostering broader
adaptive capacity requires a more staid and agnostic response, as
this research has shown.
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Appendix A. Emissions scenarios timeline.
Appendix B. Factor scores: climate change governance discourses.
Statement Factor scores (discourses)
First analysis
(all climate change
Q sorts)
Second analysis
(deliberative forum
participants only
A B C D A0 B0 D E
1. There is not enough information to deﬁnitively say that climate change is real. 1 5 5 5 2 5 3 1
2. The response to climate change is not going to be positive. The same mistakes will keep happening. 1 0 3 3 0 1 1 5
3. Climate variation is normal, so why should this be a problem? 0 3 0 0 1 3 0 1
4. More educational programmes are needed to increase public awareness about climate change. 4 2 2 3 3 5 2 1
5. Climate change will not be a problem because there will be technological solutions available. 0 1 5 0 1 0 2 3
6. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change. 1 4 5 2 1 5 0 1
7. I don’t trust what I hear about climate change from government. 3 0 2 2 4 0 0 0
8. We need strong political leadership to do something about climate change. 1 5 4 4 2 5 3 1
9. I think it is safe to say climate change is here. 2 2 4 1 3 4 1 3
10. I’m not going to do anything to address climate change because it is not a major issue. 5 5 3 2 5 4 3 3
11. There’s not much point in me doing anything to ﬁx this. No-one else is going to. 5 2 1 1 5 2 4 4
12. It’s difﬁcult to trust what comes out in the media on the issue of climate change. 5 1 1 3 5 1 1 4
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Appendix B (Continued )
Statement Factor scores (discourses)
First analysis
(all climate change
Q sorts)
Second analysis
(deliberative forum
participants only
A B C D A0 B0 D E
13. It is already too late to do anything, as any action to stop climate change will take a long time to take
effect.
4 1 3 3 3 1 4 5
14. I’m not concerned enough to do anything drastic about this, such as participate in political action. 3 3 1 3 2 3 1 2
15. It is unfair that we are going to leave the climate in a mess for future generations. 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 5
16. We should pay for greenhouse emissions. 1 2 0 2 0 2 1 3
17. We can adapt to the coming changes. 3 0 5 2 2 0 2 3
18. It is clear that we are already entering the zone of dangerous climate change. 2 3 1 0 1 2 3 2
19. I care about the planet. 5 1 0 5 5 3 4 5
20. I don’t know what to do. I’m very concerned and would like to do something, but I don’t have a realistic
shortlist of things that would really make a difference.
2 0 1 3 1 1 1 4
21. Australia does not owe it to the rest of the world to reduce emissions and suffer economically. 0 3 2 1 0 3 0 1
22. If Australia reduces greenhouse gases it won’t make a difference. That will just shift Australian jobs to
other countries.
0 2 3 1 0 1 0 2
23. This is so depressing and is so out of our control. 3 0 4 5 4 0 5 0
24. I believe that the difference we can have as an individual, in Australia, is so minimal that our actions are
worthless.
4 1 3 0 4 2 5 3
25. Australia is particularly vulnerable to climate change, and it is in our interest to help ﬁnd an effective
global solution.
3 4 3 4 2 3 4 2
26. We need laws addressing climate change because people are not going to volunteer to change. 1 3 1 5 0 2 5 1
27. I want to do something, but it is too big and too hard. 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 2
28. When I read in the paper that climate change is not true, I start to have doubts about whether it is
changing.
1 2 1 1 3 2 2 0
29. Doing something to reduce emissions feels a bit hopeless but I just want to feel that I’m doing the most I
can.
2 1 0 0 2 0 1 4
30. The fate of the planet is too important to be left to market forces. 2 5 2 2 1 1 5 2
31. Australia’s emissions are tiny, so it’s not up to us to act. 2 4 4 1 1 4 3 0
32. Governments should take a far greater role in preparing towns and cities to adapt to the impacts of
climate change.
1 4 0 1 3 4 3 1
33. Failure to address climate change is the fault of political leaders. 0 1 2 4 1 1 2 0
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